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NOTES AND COMMENT

REwARDs FOR THE RETURN OF LOST PROPERTY: ARE THEY VoiD

IN NEW YORK?
Introduction
The legal questions springing from offers of reward have occasioned much legal writing, and are the subject of a long line of
decisions throughout the United States. However, a recent decision
of the City Court of New York 1 presented an unprecedented view of
the legal problem when the court denied the right of a finder of lost
property to recover a reward offered by the owner for the return
thereof, on the ground that since it is a criminal offense not to return lost property to the known owner, 2 the finder did no more than
the law required. Under such circumstances, the court concluded,
a return of the property to the owner could not be deemed an act
sufficient to make the promise of reward binding on the owner.
At first blush this decision would appear to be a logical and conclusive application of established principles of contract law. Before
commencing upon detailed analysis of the specific problem at hand,
a brief review of the general principles of reward contracts will be
treated.
Nature of Reward Contract
The basis of the right to a reward is in the nature of a unilateral
contract, consisting of a promise for an act. The promise is usually
that of a sum of money or other compensation offered to the public
generally for the performance of a designated act ;" the method of
its publication has no effect on its validity.4 The acceptance of the

I Rheinhauer v. DeKrieges, 188 Misc. 747, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 211 (N. Y.
City Ct. 1946).
2 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1300, which provides: "A person, who finds lost
property under circumstances which give him knowledge or means of inquiry
as to the true owner, and who appropriates such property to his own use, or
to the use of another person who is not entitled thereto, without having first
made every reasonable effort to find the owner and restore the property to
him, is guilty of larceny."
This law has since been reinforced in New York City by amendment to
the Administrative Code adopted in 1943, requiring finders of lost property exceeding ten dollars in value to deposit such property with police department
within ten days after the finding thereof; violation or neglect to comply with
this statute is made a misdemeanor. ADmINISmTATsv CODE OF THE CITY OF
NEW YoRx § 435-4.1, added by Local Laws of N. Y. 1941, No. 65; repealed and
reenacted by Local Laws of N. Y. 1943, No. 47. See Garramone v. Simmons,
177 Misc. 330, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73 (1876); Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg.
Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N. W. 769 (1912) ; Kinn v. First Nat. Bank, 118 Wis.
537, 95 N. W. 969 (1903); Umatilla County v. Estes, 105 Ore. 248, 208 Pac.
761 (1922); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 28, illustration 1 (1933).
4Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N. W. 769 (1912)
(orally); Ryer v. Stockwell, 14 Cal. 134, 73 Am. Dec. 634 (1860) (advertisement in newspaper).
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offer is the act of performance of the service requested in the offer.
Until accepted, the offer is a mere proposal, and is revocable before
anything has been done in reliance thereon. 5 However, the offer
can be revoked only in the manner in which it was made, or in some
other manner which will give as much publicity as the offer did.0
It is also well settled, at least so far as private rewards are concerned, that there can be no contract unless the offeree, when giving
the desired service, knew of the offer of the reward and voluntarily
acted with the intention of accepting such offer. 7 The reason for
this is that the act may be equivocal, and therefore it is reasonable
to require proof of knowledge and intent. An exception to this
general rule is sometimes found where the reward is offered in
public statutes, on the ground that such a reward is in the8 nature
of a bounty, and that the principles of contract do not apply.
As in the case of other contracts, a consideration is necessary to
support the contract for a reward, and without it the contract is void
and unenforceable. 9 The consideration for the promise is the act;
performance of which the offeree was not already legally bound to
do. The consideration which supports the reward contract is not
benefit to the promisor. It is the trouble, inconvenience or detriment of the promisee incurred in reliance upon the promise when
he has done some act which he was not legally bound to do. 10
However, where the offeree performs an act which he was already

5 United States v. Conner, 138 U. S. 61 (1891) (repeal of statute offering
reward); Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73 (1876); McClaughry v. King.
147 Fed. 463 (8th Cir. 1906); Wilson v. Stump, 103 Cal. 255, 37 Pac. 151
(1894); Carr v. Mahaska County Bankers' Assoc., 222 Iowa 411, 269 N. W.
494 (1936). See Note, 107 A. L. R. 1085 (1937).
6 Shuey v. United States, 92 U. S. 73 (1876); Sears v. Eastern R. R.,
14 Allen 433 (Mass. 1867) ; Sullivan v. Phillips, 178 Ind. 164, 98 N. E. 868

(1912);

RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTS

§ 43, illustration 1 (1933).

See Note, 107

A. L. R. 1086 (1937); Payne v. Lautz Bros. & Co., 166 N. Y. Supp. 844
(City Ct. of Buffalo 1916), aff'd, 185 App. Div. 904, 171 N. Y. Supp. 1094
(4th Dep't 1918) senible.
Arkansas Bankers' Ass'n v. Ligon, 174 Ark. 234, 295 S. W. 4 (1927);
Howland v. Lounds, 51 N. Y. 604 (1873); Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248
(1868)
Sheldon v. George, 132 App. Div. 470, 116 N. Y. Supp. 969 (4th
Dep't 1909) ; Vitty v. Eley, 51 App. Div. 44, 64 N. Y. Supp. 397 (4th Dep't

1900) ;

RESTATEzeENT, CONTRACTS

§§ 53, 55. See Note, 53 A. L. R. 542 (1931).

s Smith v. State, 38 Nev. 477, 151 Pac. 512 (1915) (reward offered by
Governor, pursuant to act of the Legislature); Clinton County v. Davis, 162
Ind. 60, 69 N. E. 680 (1904) (reward offered in public statute) ; Choice v.
Dallas, 210 S. W. 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); see Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 100
Tex. 375, 377, 99 S. W. 1111, 1112 (1907).
9 Presbyterian Church v. Cooper, 112 N. Y. 517, 20 N. E. 352 (1889)
Young v. Hill, 67 N. Y. 162 (1876); Justice v. Lang, 42 N. Y. 162 (1870);
Harris v. Carter, 3 E. & B. 559, 118 Eng. Rep. 1251 (Q. B. 1854).
10 Furman v. Parke, 21 N. J. L. 310 (Sup. Ct. 1848); Ryer v. Stockwell,
14 Cal. 134 (1860) ; Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball [18931 1 Q. B. 256.
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bound to do, he sustains no legal detriment, and does not furnish a
sufficient consideration for the promise made to him."
It is this last mentioned element of the reward contract--consideration-with which we are primarily concerned in light of the case of
Rheinhauer v. DeKrieges,12 the pertinent facts of which follow.
The PrincipalCase
On January 5th, 1940, the defendant inserted for publication in
newspapers published and circulated in the City of New York, an
announcement or advertisement, as follows: "Bracelet containing
24 marquise, 12 half-moon, 78 baguette, 30 pentagon, 436 round
diamonds; lost New Year's Eve at Hotel Plaza: liberal reward.
Whitehall 3-1336." Prior to publication of this advertisement, and
on January 1st, 1940, the plaintiff found and lawfully acquired possession of the subject bracelet and preserved it in his possession
until the true owner thereof could be ascertained and established.
The plaintiff identified the defendant owner through the above mentioned advertisement, and returned the lost bracelet to the defendant
who refused to pay the promised reward to plaintiff. This action,
in the words of the court, was "an attempt by the plaintiff to have
the court make a determination of what would constitute a 'liberal
reward', and to render judgment for such amount." 13 The court
found it uffnecessary to do either.
Relying on its interpretation of Section 1300 of the New York
Penal Law and the Section 4354.1 of the Administrative Code of
the City of New York 14 the court held that no contract between
plaintiff and defendant resulted. In dismissing the complaint the
court said that, ".

.

. The plaintiff in this case did that and only

that which was imposed on her as a duty pursuant to law and the
performance of such an act or obligation constitutes no consideration to support a promise for the payment of a reward." 15
Before going further, it should be recalled that the mere fact that
the finder of lost property in the first instance obtained possession
of such property lawfully, is no defense to a prosecution for larceny,
when he subsequently wrongfully withheld or appropriated such
property to his own use. 16 In other words, the finder of an unidentified article is not criminally liable for not performing the impossible act of returning it to the owner. But the duty does come into
being when he receives knowledge of the true owner. By this reason"1Smith v. Whilden, 10 Pa. 39, 49 Am. Dec. 572 (1848) ; Coleman v. Burr,
93 N. Y. 17 (1883); WHITNEY, CoNT.Ac'rs § 45 (4th ed. 1946); see note 9

supra.
12

188 Misc. 747, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 211 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).

13 Id. at 747, 67 N. Y. S. 2d at 212.

For text and discussion of these statutes, see note 2 supra.
Is188 Misc. 747, 748, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 211, 213 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).
16 N. Y. PENAL LAW § 1290(2).
14
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ing it would appear to be conclusive that the act of returning a lost
article to the true owner is an act required by law, and as such, the
act cannot be a sufficient consideration for the offer of a reward.
But the decision in the Rheinhauer case, based as it is upon the
court's interpretation of the Penal Law and the Administrative Code,
is subject to sound objections.
Keeping in mind the general rule that a criminal statute is to be
strictly construed, let us look at Section 1300 of the Penal Law. It
is composed of two distinct parts or elements. The first part reads:
"A person, who finds lost property under circumstances which give
him knowledge or means of inquiry as to the true owner, . .

."

thus

describing the class of persons to be affected by the statute by the
circumstances of the finding.

The next part reads; ".

.

. and who

appropriates such property to his own use, or to the use of another
person who is not entitled thereto, without having first made every
reasonable effort to find the owner and restore the property to him,
is guilty of larceny" (italics mine). The second element imposes a
duty of performance upon the class of persons described in the first
element. In other words, a person answering the description in the
first part of this statute must perform the duty prescribed in the
second part thereof, or be guilty of larceny. Obviously then, if a
person does not fit the exact description of the first clause, he is not
under any obligation to perform the duties prescribed in the second
part.
Looking again to the first clause of the above section, we see that
the person described is one who finds lost property under circumstances which give him knowledge or means of inquiry as to the true
owner of that property. These circumstances of finding are described
in the present tense. By necessary implication, therefore, the circumstances which give the finder knowledge as to the true owner
must be circumstances at the time of the finding of lost property.
Clearly then, the finder who acquires his knowledge of the true owner
after he has found the property is not of the class of persons described in this part of the statute, and is not subject to perform the
duties laid down in the subsequent part of Section 1300.
Without going any further, that is, without even inspecting the
obligation imposed under the second clause, we can now see the
patent error of the decision in the Rheinhauer case. At the time of
the finding, the plaintiff in that case had no knowledge or means of
inquiry as to the true owner. The fact that the plaintiff subsequently
acquired such knowledge, through the defendant's advertisement,
several days later, could not bring her within the provisions of Section
1300, which, as we have seen, applies only to knowledge at the instant of the finding. Thus, the plaintiff was never bound to perform
the obligation stated in the latter part of that section. She was not
bound by any legal obligations, and therefore, the court's finding
that the plaintiff did only that which she was legally bound to do by
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the penal law and did not give consideration for the promised reward, is manifest error.
Now, for the purpose of seeing whether it is possible for a finder
to enter into a binding and enforceable reward contract, even though
he has knowledge of the owner at the time of the finding, let us further examine the exact nature of the obligation iinposed on such a
person by Section 1300 of the Penal Law.
The second element of this statute obligates the person described
in the first element to make ". . . every reasonable effort to find the
owner and restore the property to him, ....

" (Italics mine).

To

put it in a simpler form, the statute requires the person who has
found lost property with knowledge of the owner to restore such
property to the owner. The obligation thus imposed is to restore
the property to the owner; the statute does not say that the finder
must return the property into the actual possession of the owner.
From this observation it is reasonable to assume that if the legislature had intended the latter meaning, they would have used the word
"return" rather than the word "restore." The reasonableness of
this interpretation can be clearly seen if we reflect on the following
illustration. Suppose that B, a resident of the city of Buffalo, in this
state, while visting in New York City, loses his wallet. A, a resident
of New York City, innocently finds the wallet which is clearly identifiable as B's property from documents therein. Surely, in such
circumstances, A would not be held guilty of larceny because he did
not take an expensive trip of several hundred miles to return the
wallet into B's possession. Rather A could restore the property by
writing a letter to B, advising him that the wallet will be turned over
to B upon his properly identifying himself as the owner.
By this reasoning, the finder can restore the property to the
owner by several alternative methods, none of which amount to an actual return of the article, but all of which are a sufficient performance
so as to discharge the finder from the obligation imposed on him by
Section 1300 of the Penal Law. The finder can notify the owner
in person, by telephone, telegraph, or by writing a letter, as well as
by inserting an announcement directed to the owner in a local newspaper. In New York City, he may deposit the article with the property clerk of the police department, in accordance with Section 435-4.1
of the Administrative Code of that city. In regard to the last method
of restoration, it is interesting to note that prior to the 1943 amendment making it mandatory to deposit lost property with the police
department of New York City, the Supreme Court of New York
held that a finder had only the duty to report the finding to the police
department, not to deposit the property therewith.1 7 Although not
directly in point, this would seem to support the above construction
that Section 1300 of the Penal Law does not require a return of the
3. Garramone v. Simmons, 177 Misc. 330, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 465 (Sup. Ct.
1941). See note 2 supra.
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property into the possession of the owner, since mere notification to
the police certainly does not amount to an actual return to the owner.
Up to this point, we have seen that the finder is under a general
duty to restore the property to the owner, that this general duty
may be discharged by any one of several alternative methods, that
the finder is at liberty to select any one of these methods, and finally
that none of these methods of restoration amount to an actual return
of the property into the possession of the owner.
From these observations, we may conclude that the act of returning as distinguished from restoring the lost property to the true owner,
is an act not required of any finder by Section 1300 of the Penal Law;
and, therefore, such an act is good consideration for an offer of reward notwithstanding that the finder had actual knowledge of the
owner's identity at the time he found the lost property.
Assuming these observations to be correct, it is clear that the decision in the Rheinhauer case is incorrect and is not a true expression
of the law in New York. First, the plaintiff in that case was not
one of the class of finders upon whom Section 1300 of the Penal
Law imposes its obligation, since the plaintiff did not have knowledge
of the owner at the time she found the property. It was error to
base the decision on that statute. Second, even if the plaintiff had
been one of the class of finders referred to above, nevertheless, her
act of returning the property to the defendant was an act not required by Section 1300 of the Penal Law. It was error, therefore, to
hold that the plaintiff did not give sufficient consideration to support
the defendant's promise of a reward.
In an attempt to clarify and justify the unforeseen harshness of
its decision, the court distinguished the principal case, where notice
of identity of the owner comes to the finder through the medium of
the offer of reward after the property is already in the possession of
the finder, from the case where, acting upon an advertisement of this
nature, lost property is sought after and found. Of the latter type
case the court said, ".

.

. an act not required of the finder is induced

by the offer of reward, and, in acting upon such offer, a consideration
results . . . " 18

That performance of acts which differ, or are in addition to. the
duty owed to the promisor or to the public, is sufficient consideration,
is too well settled to require citation of authority. The real issue for
determination is whether or not the finder in the first situation above
stands in any different position, so far as consideration is concerned,
than the finder who is induced to search for the property by the offer
of reward. The writer's search reveals no case on all fours with the
Rheinhauer case either in New York or in any state; therefore, the
solution must be sought after by the process of deduction and induction from holdings of cases not directly in point.
18 188 Misc. 747, 749, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 211, 213 (N. Y. City Ct. 1946).
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In the case of Pierson v. Norch,19 an action was brought to recover the amount of a reward for the return of lost property as
advertised in a newspaper. The plaintiff had found the property on
a railroad train. She made no inquiries as to the true owner, but
returned the property after reading the defendant's public announcement. After granting judgment to the plaintiff on the ground that
there was a valid and binding contract created between the parties,
the court went on to make the following statements on the question
of larceny of lost goods: "Under the circumstances the jury
might have found . . . a dishonest intention to take and carry
away the property; there would then have been a trespass or
larceny; but no want of care or earnestness or even an entire
omission of inquiry would necessarily give to that act such a
quality. If the plaintiff really found and took possession of the
goods, believing them to be lost, and with a purpose to preserve and return them if possible to the owner, she was in condition to clain the reward upon complying with its terms." 20 (Italics
mine.) However, it must be borne in mind that the court's interpretation of larceny of lost articles in this case was based upon the
common law. The predecessor to our present Section 1300 of the
New York Penal Law, which defines the finder's duties, was not
enacted until one year after the decision in the Pierson case. 21
Nevertheless, we find support of the court's views in an opinion
expressed by the Attorney General of New York. In regard to the
present statute, he said, "Where the finder has knowledge or means
of inquiry as to the true owner, he must make every reasonable effort
to find the owner; . . .where knowledge or means of inquiry do not
exist he should make some effort to locate the owner." 22 (Italics
mine.) This statement seems to indicate that the finder of unidentifiable property is not guilty of larceny for not performing the impossible task of returning it; and that the mere retention and preservation of the property, with the manifest intent to retain it until the
owner can be located, and to claim any offered reward, is not a crime.
From this it may reasonably be concluded that since the finder
already has formed the intent to return the property upon identifying
the owner, and the owner intends to give a reward for the return
thereof by the very words of his advertisement, therefore, upon a
return of the property there is mutual assent by both parties, and,
notwithstanding the public duty imposed by the criminal law, a valid
contract has been consummated.
The law does not completely overlook the morals of society. In
fact the very statute now under consideration was obviously enacted
as a legal threat to finders of lost property; a weapon with which
1982 N. Y. 503 (1880).
20 Id. at
21 Laws

506.
of N. Y. 1881, c. 676, § 539.
22 1934 Op. Atty. Gen. 101.
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to "prompt" such persons to perform their duty to their neighbors.
It is equally clear that the owner of lost property offers a reward for
its return as an inducement to the finder to return it though we may
presume that the owner knows the finder is legally bound to return
his property, he also knows that the finder might easily convert the
property to his own use and skillfully avoid criminal prosecution
therefor. The owner who publicly offers a reward for the return of
his property intends it to be additional inducement to the finder to
perform his legal and moral duty. The reward assures the owner of
a return of his property forthwith; it assures him that there will be no
delay, no civil or criminal actions, no trouble in speedily regaining
possession of his property. With such a motive, with such clear intent, it cannot seem other than unjust to allow the owner boldly to
deny any liability under the cover of a statute which has at its very
core, a purpose to further promote a moral cause.
Unless and until there is a decision on this question by a court of
last resort, the only speedy way to clarify the right to a reward is by
state legislation. At least two states in the Union have taken such
action. Both Iowa and Montana have criminal statutes requiring the
finder of lost goods to return same to the known
owner, similar to
23
the Section 1300 of the New York Penal Law.
These states have recognized the problem which can be raised by
a seemingly perfect legal defense to a claim for reward, and have
obviated this doubt by enacting statutory rewards. The Iowa statute
provides:

"Before restitution of the property . . . shall be made,

the finder shall be entitled to ten per cent. upon value thereof." 24
The Montana statute entitles the finder of lost property to compensation for "all expenses necessarily incurred by him in its preservation,
and for any other service necessarily performed
by him about it,
25
and to a reasonable reward for keeping it."

Such statutes have been held valid 26 and not inconsistent with the
criminal statutes providing for restoration to the owner of the property by the finder. 27 Rather, the courts have held that the reward
statutes are enacted for the laudible purpose of aiding people to find
their lost property by the benefit of a public search therefor, and
must be considered beneficial. 28 In respect to the Iowa reward
statute, the court said, "

. .

. (the statute) in effect declares it to be

23 IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.11 (1946); MONTANA REV. CODE ANN. § 94-2709
(1947).
24 IOWA CODE ANN. § 644.13 (1946) ; see Flood v. City Nat. Bank of Clinton,
218 Iowa 898, 253 N. W. 509 (1934).
25 MONTANA REv. CODE ANN. § 20.404 (1947) ; see Kirk v. Smith, 48 Mont.
489, 138 Pac. 1088 (1914).
26 Flood v. City Nat. Bank of Clinton, 218 Iowa 898, 253 N. W. 509 (1934)
(holding, among other things, that such a statute is not an unlawful deprivation of property).
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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the public policy of this state for the good and welfare of its people
to provide a reward to the finder of lost goods.

.

.

. (it)

is in effect

simply awarding a compensation for the service of finding such lost
goods. The owner has been benefited by the plaintiff's act in finding
the money." 29

In considering the Iowa treatment of the reward problem, it
should be noted that in the case of Flood v. City Nat. Bank 30 the defendant therein denied his liability to pay the statutory reward on the
precise point of the Rheinhauer case, namely, that the plaintiff was
bound by a criminal statute to return the property to the known
owner. For the reasons declared above, the court stated that it is
"immaterial whether the finder of lost goods does or does not know
to whom the property belongs." 81 (Italics mine.)
Conclusion
It is respectfully submitted that the court in the Rheinhauer case
construed Section 1300 of the New York Penal Law in such a broad
sense as to extend its scope into a field never intended by the legislature. Although there is no New York case in point, it is apparent
from the preceding discussion of the laws of Iowa and Montana that
a criminal statute requiring the finder to return lost property to the
known owner is not intended to nullify the beneficial result of reward
contracts. These states have expressly declared this intent in their
statutes. There is no valid reason to negate the presumption that
such was also the intent of the New York Legislature; intent to
punish criminals, not to punish honest men. For such is the harsh
result of the reasoning of the Rheinhauercase.
Since the application of the law in the Rheinhauer case may, in
an unnaturally broad sense, be said to be legally correct, it is earnestly
to be hoped that the Legislature of New York will take some formal
action to clarify its intent.
SHERWINT

29

1d. at 904, 253 N. W. at 514.

SO218 Iowa 898, 253 N. W. 509 (1934).

32Id. at 901, 253 N. W. at 511.

E. ALLEN.

